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Abstract:  This study examines both the quantity and price of risk exposure for different
segments of financial intermediaries in order to determine whether market segmentation
exists in the financial services industry in the United States. We distinguish between
depository institutions, securities firms, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other
financial firms using each company s SIC code. We find evidence of market segmentation
in both market risk levels and market risk premiums.
The results provide little evidence of interest rate risk exposure across all types of
financial intermediaries, suggesting the prevalence of hedging programs using interest rate
derivatives. However, the market prices interest rate risk exposure differentially by type of
financial intermediary. We find that as a market segment, insurance companies were
exposed to more interest rate risk particularly in the period late 1980 s to early 1990 s. The
interest rate risk premium for banks was among the highest of all financial intermediaries.
Overall, we find that securities firms, as a group, have the most market risk
exposure, followed in order of descending market beta, by banks, other financial firms,
insurance companies, and mutual funds, although the order is reversed when examining
the market risk premium. Indeed, we find support for an inverse relationship between the
quantity and price for market risk, but not for interest rate risk.
When we investigate the impact of two regulatory policy changes, we find that (1)
the shift in the conduct of monetary policy towards targeting of monetary aggregates
induced banks to take on more market risk, probably due to a decline in their charter value;
(2) bank market risk-taking increased further with the introduction of risk-based capital
requirements which further reduce charter value for banks; and (3) insurance companies
are subject to the highest interest rate risk premiums during the 1988-1994 subperiod,
following by commercial banks, probably due to interest rate risk subsidy under the risk-
based capital requirements. Overall, during the period 1974-1994, banks increased their
market risk exposure despite the tightening of regulatory restrictions, insurance companies
increased their interest rate risk exposure over the subperiods.
We create synthetic universal banks comprised of portfolios of banks, securities
firms, and insurance companies. We find that the synthetic universal banks have
significantly positive excess returns, with lower market and interest rate risk exposures and
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I. Introduction
During the decade of the 1980's, the catch phrase in the field of financial intermediation was “global
financial supermarket” or in academic parlance “universal banking”. In many countries, lines of distinction
separating commercial banking from investment banking from insurance and other financial services have become
blurred as financial intermediaries crossed industry boundaries. In the U.S., the first half of the decade of the 1990's
has witnessed the dismantling of many financial empires. Perceived synergies and potential diversification benefits
are perhaps not substantial enough to outweigh the managerial agency problems and information costs of managing
diverse financial intermediaries. The swing of the pendulum from an era of consolidation to greater specialization
should be manifest in the risk/return tradeoff for financial intermediaries. In this paper, we examine this tradeoff
for different types of financial institutions.
Financial intermediaries (e.g., commercial banks vs. investment banks vs. insurance companies) can be
distinguished by differences in both market structure and regulatory environment. The government’s regulatory
safety net, while more generous for banks than for other nonbank financial intermediaries, is also more onerous and
restrictive. Competitive conditions vary among the types of financial intermediaries with implications for their
operational efficiency as well as product differentiation and the market power of the individual firm. These
distinctions, if significant, create market segmentation among financial institutions.
Several studies have recently examined various aspects of market segmentation and universal banking. 
1
Empirical evidence has been found to support universal banking based on experiences in the UK [Llewllyn (1995)],
Japan [Hoshi (1995)], and Switzerland [Kilgus (1995)]; as well as mixed evidence for the Korean experience [Park,
Kim, and Park (1995)] and Germany [Baums (1995)]. We cannot perform a similar analysis in the U.S. because
of de jure, although not de facto, Glass Steagall restrictions on universal banking activity. However, in this paper,
we evaluate potential risk diversification benefits by determining whether financial intermediary segments in the U.S.
have differing risk/return characteristics.
1 See for example, Kane (1995), and Eisenbeis (1995) for banks’ expansion into insurance activities; Rajan
(1995), Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1995), and Puri (1996) for securities underwriting.
1We investigate the degree of market segmentation among the different types of financial intermediaries in
order to assess the potential benefits of universal banking in the U.S. We use a two-factor model to estimate both
the quantity and price of risk for U.S. banks, securities firms, insurance companies, investment companies, and
other financial firms (that are traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ), allowing for fluctuations over time.
We test for systematic risk differentials across market segments and compare the results to synthesized universal
banks comprised of a portfolio of banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.
Section II describes the data. In Section III, we analyze the impact of market segmentation on returns
allowing for time-varying betas and risk premiums, estimated over the period 1974-1994. In Section IV, we
examine the impact on market assessment of risks and returns of two distinct policy regime shifts, i.e. the monetary
policy shift in October 1979 and the introduction of international risk-adjusted capital requirements in July 1988.
In Section V, we construct synthetic universal banks and compare their performance and risk characteristics with
those of segmented financial intermediaries. Section VI presents summary and conclusions.
II. The Data
We utilize monthly data from January 1974-December 1994, a total of 21 years, for all financial institutions
whose shares are traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We distinguish among depository institutions (SIC
codes 60, 6711, 6712, and 6719)2, security and commodity broker/dealers (SIC code 62), insurance companies (SIC
code 63), mutual funds (SIC codes 6722, 6723, 6724 and 6726), and other financial companies (SIC codes 61, 65,
6733, 6790, 6792, 6794, 6798, and 6799).
3 The total number of financial firms is 1,023. In this sample, 34.3%
of the firms are depository institutions; 18.9% securities firms; 7.6% insurance companies; 14.3% mutual funds;
and 24. 9% other financial companies. The securities firms are denoted with a dummy variable DUMSEC= 1;
DUMINS = 1 for insurance companies; DUMMF = 1 for mutual funds; and DUMOTH = 1 for other financial firms.
Depository institutions represent the base case for which all dummy variables take on a value of zero.
All monthly returns and value weighted market indices are obtained from the CRSP tape, with the interest
2 These include bank holding companies.
3 These other financial companies include nondepository credit institutions, real estate firms, and holding and
other investment offices.
2rate index from Citibase. Over the entire time period 1974-1994, the value weighted CRSP index averaged a
monthly rate of return of 0.99%, as compared to a monthly return for the S&P 500 of 0.78% per month. Three-
month U.S. Treasury bill rates averaged 0.57% per month and the monthly rate of retum for the sample of 1,023
financial firms averaged 0.93 %.
The financial intermediaries with the highest average return over the period 1974-1994 were securities
firms, with an average monthly return of 1.56%, followed by 1.29% for insurance companies, and 1.12% for
depository institutions. Note, however, that these descriptive statistics do not take risks into account.
III. The Two Factor Model With Time-Varying Betas and Risk Premiums
We follow a well-developed literature and estimate a two-factor model using both market and interest rate
risk factors. Flannery and James (1984a,b), Sweeney and Warga (1986), Yourougou (1990), Bae (1990), Madura
and Zarruk (1995) all estimate the two factor model for samples of U.S. and international (in Madura and Zarruk
(1995)) banks.
4 Most studies find a statistically significant negative coefficient on both short term and long term
interest factors. These results are consistent with interest rate sensitivity in bank returns. In this study, we begin
by applying the model to a sample of bank and nonbank financial intermediaries to examine whether nonbank
financial intermediaries’ returns are also affected by interest rate risk exposure.
If market segmentation exists, we would observe differential rates of return for different types of financial
intermediaries. The impact of intersectoral barriers to entry and differential charter values, if they exist, could be
manifest in either an impact on the quantity of risk undertaken by the financial firm and/or the price of risk levied
by the market. That is, the well-known moral hazard side effects of the governmental safety net may induce certain
types of financial intermediaries to undertake greater amounts of risk than others. Moreover, because of implicit
governmental and private guarantees, the market may price a unit of risk differently for different types of financial
intermediaries.
IIIa. The Impact of Market Segmentation on the Quantity of Risk
Both the regulatory environment and the market structure affect financial intermediaries’ risk/return
4 Kane and Unal (1988) offer a partial survey of this literature.
3tradeoffs. In the U. S., these underlying environmental factors depend, in large part, upon the financial firm’s
charter. The charter determines each financial institution’s market segment. Each firm’s optimal risk position
depends upon the charter type, since some segments are the beneficiary of more government largess than others.
Moral hazard concerns would dictate that the more generous the governmental guarantee, the greater the optimal
level of risk exposure, ceteris paribus. Thus, we would observe firms in market segments with more generous
governmental safety nets having higher risk levels. In contrast, if governmental guarantees proscribe excessive risk
taking by imposing restrictions and monitoring limitations on financial intermediaries’ risk taking behavior, then
we would observe an inverse relationship between governmental regulation and risk exposure. Which effect prevails
is an empirical question to be resolved in this paper.
Our sampling period 1974-1994 was a period of upheaval in financial markets. The roles of financial
intermediaries were altered by market forces (such as the LDC debt crisis, the 1987 and 1989 market breaks, the
growth of derivatives, etc.) as well as regulatory initiatives (the European Rate Mechanism, changes in the conduct
of monetary policy, the thrift crisis in the U.S. and resulting legislative initiatives, such as the Basle international
capital requirements). These shifts should impact both the risk taking activities of the financial intermediaries, as
well as the market’s assessment of required rates of returns for given levels of risk exposure.
Following Ferson and Harvey [1991, 1993], we use a two-stage regression analysis which allows the betas
to vary both across firms and over time. The first stage estimates the two-factor market model. with time-varying
betas over the period 1974-1994 consists of
(1)
where RMt is the monthly market index, measured by the value-weighted CRSP index; RIt is the monthly interest
rate index, measured by the three month U.S. Treasury bill rate; Rit is the monthly rate of return (including
dividends) for the 1,023 financial intermediaries. In the first stage of the model, a time series regression is run for
. .
We employ a 60-month rolling window to estimate monthly beta coefficients. That is, instead of estimating
equation (1) using a single regression over the period 1974-1994, a different set of coefficients is estimated for each
month using returns from the previous 60 months. Thus, we perform this estimation for each firm, for each of the
4252 months in the period 1974- 1994.5
In the second stage, we utilize the coefficient estimates from the first stage as inputs. To examine the







This result is consistent with previous studies that find a market risk beta below and around one, and a negative
interest rate risk beta for financial firms.
7
Table 1 presents the results of the two-stage estimation of the quantity of risk using 60-month rolling betas
the financial intermediary’s charter value independent of risk exposure. This can be viewed as a measure of market
segmentation that is not a function of either the financial intermediaries’ risk taking or the market’s risk pricing
behaviors. The results in Table 1 show that insurance companies have significantly (at the 1% level) lower charter
values than all other types of financial intermediaries. This amounts to a statistically significant (at the 1% level)
decline in insurance company returns of almost 29 basis points.
5 Braun, Nelson, and Sunier (1991), in comparing this methodology to the estimation of time-varying betas
using an EGARCH model, obtain similar results.
6 There is an “error in the variables” problem in this specification of the dependent variable in a two stage
regression as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). The problem arises because the efficiency condition on the expected
risk/return equation is in terms of the true values of the betas, but in the empirical tests, estimated betas must be
used. See Amsler and Schmidt (1985) and Shanken (1992) for a review of these issues.
7 Flannery and James (1984), Booth and Officer (1985), Sweeney and Warga (1986), Yourougou (1990), and
Bae (1990) all find that banks have significantly negative coefficients on various interest rate (and bond price)
factors. We performed our analysis using both 3-month and 1-year Treasury rates, with no impact on our results.
5rates of return of depository institutions, securities firms, and mutual funds. Although all of these financial
intermediaries have higher charter values imputed into their rates of returns than insurance companies, differences
among them are not statistically significant. This suggests that the value of the governmental safety net offered to
depository institutions is offset by the regulatory burden.
[Insert Table 1 Around Here]
Depository institutions may overcome their value-reducing regulatory burden and increase their market
values by increasing their risk exposures. This moral hazard conclusion is consistent with the results for the market
have significantly less (at the 1% level) market risk than do banks. These results are consistent with banks’ taking
on additional market risk exposure than insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial intermediaries,
perhaps as a moral hazard response to the implicit guarantees provided by the governmental safety net. However,
securities firms on average have the highest market betas of all financial institutions.
Using the intercept term of equation (3) in the time-varying results shown
average market beta of 1.104. Similarly, Table 1 shows that securities firms have an
in Table 1, banks have an
average market risk beta of
1.3, while mutual funds have an average market risk of .52. Other financial firms have an average market beta
of .92, as compared to insurance companies with an average market beta of .88, which represents a statistically
significant (at the 1% level) .22 below the average for banks. 
8
When we examine systematic interest rate risk in equation (4), our results are quite different. Most
financial intermediaries have interest rate risk exposures that are statistically insignificant from zero. This suggests
that there is no market segmentation effect in interest rate risk exposure. The one exception is for insurance
companies, shown in Table 1 to have a significantly positive interest rate risk beta of 1.2 on average. This may
be the result of the long maturity liabilities of the life insurance companies that dominate our sample of insurance
firms. Indeed, the proportion of life insurance companies in our sample of insurance companies doubled over the
8 We have also estimated the market model of equation (1) assuming constant betas. The results (not reported
here) suggest that the assumption of constant betas introduces an upward bias into measurements of market risk.
This may be a function of the increasingly stringent regulations governing financial intermediation during the time
period. In particular, as forbearance was curtailed in the wake of the thrift crisis of the early 1980s, the moral
hazard incentives for financial companies to engage in risk enhancing activities were reduced. This is reflected in
the time-varying measures of risk, but not in the model using constant betas.
6time period of the study. For all other market sectors, financial intermediaries appear to be hedging their interest
rate risk exposure, thereby producing the insignificant coefficients on their interest rate risk factors.
IIIb. The Impact of Market Segmentation on the Pricing of Risk
Our results from the previous section suggest that market segmentation impacts the financial intermediaries’
systematic risk levels. In this section, we examine whether the market’s assessment of the cost per unit of risk
differ across market segments. For example, if certain financial intermediaries in certain segments are perceived
to be “too big to fail”, then even riskier firms may have a lower risk premium built into their rates of return.
Following Ferson and Harvey (1991), we utilize a three-stage regression analysis to estimate the impact
of market segmentation of financial firms’ risk premiums. allowing both the betas and the risk premiums to vary
over time. The first stage is identical to the first stage in the quantity of risk analysis. We use a time-series model
with a 60-month rolling window to estimate time-varying betas in equation (1). The second stage utilizes these
coefficients to estimate a cross-sectional model to analyze the monthly risk premium, allowing the risk premiums
to vary over time. Thus, the market’s monthly assessment of the price of market risk and interest rate risk is
estimated using the following expression:
(5)
In stage three, the monthly estimates of the two risk premiums are regressed on the relative proportions
of each segment of financial intermediary in the market. Thus, we estimate:
(6)
(7)
insurance firms (INS), mutual funds (MF), and all other financial intermediaries (OTH).
7Table 2 presents the results of this three-stage estimation model for the 1974-1994 period. The greater the
proportion of securities firms and insurance companies in the financial services industry, the lower the average
market risk premium. The market risk premium is significantly (at the 1% level) higher for mutual funds and other
financial intermediaries than for securities firms, banks, and insurance companies. The governmental safety net
offered to banks is reflected in the lower market risk premium for these firms than for mutual funds and other
financial firms. Securities firms have the lowest market risk premiums, almost 28 basis points below that of the
banks. This comparative advantage in market risk pricing for securities firms may account for their highest levels
of market risk taking among all financial intermediaries, as discussed earlier based on results in Table 1.
[Insert Table 2 Around Here]
The interest rate risk premium is analyzed in equation (7). Table 2 shows that the price of interest rate
risk increases significantly (at the 1% level) the greater the proportion of banks in the financial services industry.
Banks’ higher interest rate risk premium is consistent with the market’s assessment that the banks’ governmental
safety net, while covers market risk, does not cover interest rate risk exposure. Increasing the proportion of
securities firms, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial firms significantly decreases the price of
interest rate risk.
Comparing the results on the price of risk to those on the quantity of risk, the insurance companies’ high
levels of interest rate risk, shown in Table 1, may be a reaction to their relatively low premium for interest rate risk
exposure, which is almost 53 basis points below that of the banks. Similarly, the banks’ high interest rate risk
premium shown in Table 2 may explain their reluctance to take on interest rate risk, as shown by the insignificant
IV. Policy Implications
In Section III, we modeled intertemporal shifts in risk levels and premia using an exogenously determined
60-month rolling window. However, intertemporal shifts in risk premia may be the result of discrete policy
changes, such as the introduction of international capital requirements, or shifts in monetary and/or exchange rate
policy regimes. This section tests this assertion by examining the impact of policy changes on financial firms’ risk
taking behavior, market assessment of the unit price of risk, and financial intermediary segmentation.
8In particular, we test the impact of two major policy shifts: (1) the October 1979 shift in the conduct of
monetary policy; and (2) the July 1988 announcement of international risk-adjusted capital requirements. The
impact of the monetary policy regime shift, dramatically increasing interest rate volatility, should affect both the
quantity and price of financial intermediaries’ interest rate risk exposure. The imposition of risk-based capital
requirements is likely to alter the optimal levels of risk and should affect the market’s assessment of financial
intermediaries’ market risk premiums, as well as the estimates of the market beta.
We use the rolling-window methodology of Section III to estimate the parameters for each of the time
period segments. The time period segments are: (1) Pre-monetary policy shift: January 1974-September 1979; (2)
Pre-Basle capital requirements: October 1979-June 1988; and (3) July 1988-December 1994. Because of the shorter
length of the time segments. we utilize a 36-month rolling window, rather than the 60-month window used in
Section III. We present the results of this estimation in Tables 3 and 4.
[Insert Table 3 Around Here]
Table 3 examines the impact of policy regime shifts on the quantity of risk, as measured by the market
beta, the interest rate beta, and the intercept term, using equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 for each sub-period. Examination
market and regulatory environments became less friendly to the banking industry during 1979-1988 and 1988-1994,
the banks’ excess returns, as measured by the intercept term, became insignificantly different from zero.
Not surprisingly, securities firms demonstrate significantly (at the 1% level) positive excess returns during
the 1979-1988 period largely characterized by bull markets and a boom in mergers and financial innovations. Table
3 shows that mutual funds and other financial intermediaries shared in these excess returns, averaging around 7 basis
points for each during this period, as compared to the almost 20 basis point excess returns for securities firms
during 1979-1988.
Results presented in Table 1 suggest that, during 1974-1994, securities firms have the highest average
market beta when compared to all other types of financial intermediaries. The results in Table 3 (sub-period)
suggest that this is the case during the 1974-1979 subperiod. However, during 1979-1994, both banks and securities
firms had the highest market betas, with an insignificant difference between them. The market’s assessment of bank
9risk levels was high during this period because of a series of consecutive credit crises (LDC debt, farm credit debt,
oil company debt, real estate debt). Despite progressively tighter bank regulations and restrictions on forbearance,
bank market risk exposure increased over the period.
The secular increase in bank market risk exposure during 1979-1994 is consistent with a risk enhancing
response to decline in bank charter values (see Keeley (1990)). Moreover, banks may engage in excessive risk-
taking due to the moral hazard result of implicit government guarantees which subsidize banking operations. During
the earliest period, January 1974-September 1979, before the shift in the monetary policy regime, insurance
companies had significantly (at the one percent level) higher market betas than did banks. The lower level of market
risk taking for banks in the 1974-1979 period is consistent with the relatively stable interest rate environment during
that period. Bank charters were valued at the capitalized spread earned from extending long term loans financed
with short term, low cost deposit sources of funds. To preserve that charter value, banks voluntarily constrained
their levels of risk-taking. When the monetary policy regime shifted, the value of bank charters fell. Banks lost
their monopoly over low cost deposits and the rewards to running the banks’ traditional short book were all but
eliminated. The results in Table 3 suggest that banks responded to the shift in monetary policy by increasing their
market risk exposure.
Recall that, from Table 1, all financial intermediaries except insurance companies are not exposed to
significant amount of interest rate risk during the entire 1974-1994 period. However, the subperiod results in Table
3 show that banks and other financial intermediaries had significant (at the one percent level) levels of interest rate
risk exposure during the 1974-1979. This is consistent with the more stable interest rates of the 1974-1979 period
before the monetary policy shift. During this period, banks had significant exposures to increasing interest rates,
as reflected in the negative coefficient on the interest rate risk factor. In contrast, securities firms had marginally
significant (at the 10% level) exposure to declining interest rates.
After 1979, banks had both the incentive and the opportunity to hedge interest rate risk exposure using
derivatives
, as reflected in the insignificant coefficients for the interest rate factor for banks during 1979-1994
shown in Table 3. Insurance companies’ high interest rate risk levels, discussed in Section III, are seen to be a
9 This is consistent with Jagtiani, Saunders, and Udell (1995) concerning banks’ motivation and pattern of
engaging in off-balance sheet derivatives (futures, options, and swaps) during their sampling period 1984-1991.
10phenomenon of the latest period, 1988-1994 only. Insurance companies may have exploited the unusually steep
yield curves of this period and taken on unprecedented levels of interest rate risk exposure.
[Insert Table 4 Around Here]
Table 4 examines the risk premium over the three policy regimes, using equations 1, 5, 6, and 7. Market
risk premiums for securities firms were the lowest among all financial intermediaries during all three sub-periods.
For other financial firms, the market risk premium varied from period to period.
An inverse relationship between the price and the quantity of market risk is most apparent during the stable
1974-1979 period. Using the results presented in Tables 3, we can rank the market segments in order of market
risk exposure from highest to lowest as follows: securities firms, insurance companies, other firms, banks, and
mutual funds. In contrast, using Table 4 results to measure market risk premiums, the ranking is exactly the
opposite: mutual funds (highest), banks, other firms, insurance companies, and securities firms (lowest). This
suggests that those market segments with the lowest market risk premiums take on the highest quantities of market
risk.
This reverse relationship does not hold well during 1979-1988 and 1988-1994 sub-periods. For example,
during 1988-1994 (after the Basle Accord announcement), banks were taking on more market risk than other types
of financial intermediaries, and banks were simultaneously subject to the highest market risk premium.
Unlike in the case of market risk, the relationship (direct rather than inverse relationship) between the price
and the quantity of interest rate risk is less evident during the stable 1974-1979 period. From Table 3, we can rank
market segments in order of interest rate risk premiums from highest to lowest as follows: other financial
intermediaries (OTH), commercial banks (COM), securities firms (SEC), insurance companies (INS), and mutual
funds (MF). Comparing with the results in Table 3, this ranking suggests a direct relationship between the price
and the quantity of interest rate risk -- reflecting the highest interest rate risk level for OTH, but an insignificant
difference in the interest rate risk levels among COM, SEC, INS, and MF.
The impact of the monetary policy shift is also apparent in the interest rate risk premiums shown in Table
4. The results show that, for commercial banks, both the levels of interest rate risk (Table 3) and interest rate risk
premiums (Table 4) declined during the 1979-1988 and 1988-1994 periods. However, banks were still subject to
the second highest interest rate risk premiums of all financial intermediaries.
11In the wake of the passage of the Basle capital requirements during the 1988-1994 period, interest rate risk
premiums on banks and insurance companies increased to levels significantly (at the one percent level) higher than
all other types of financial intermediaries. This could be a reaction to the structure of the risk-adjusted capital
requirements for banks and insurance companies that levied a cost for credit risk, but implicitly subsidized interest
rate risk exposure (see Allen, Jagtiani, and Landskroner (1996)). Moreover, the extremely large interest rate risk
premiums charged for insurance companies during the 1988-1994 period reflect their largest quantities of interest
rate risk exposure among all financial intermediaries. The market assessed a catastrophic risk premium on insurance
companies that took on extraordinarily high levels of interest rate risk exposure during the 1988-1994 period.
V. Market Segmentation versus Synthetic Universality
We have identified significant differences in both risk taking and risk pricing across market segments of
financial intermediaries. In this section, we examine whether combining market segments, via universal banking,
offers the possibility of risk diversification benefits. Since universal banking is not permitted de jure
10 in the
United States, we construct a “synthetic universal bank” 
11, which is a portfolio consisting of one depository
institution, one securities firm, and one insurance company.
12 We replicated synthetic universal banks by choosing
every possible combination of these three market segments. In order to create a times series of returns for each
universal bank, we were limited to consideration of firms with returns for the entire period. Out of our sample,
only nine securities firms had continuous data for a period extending from January 1986 to December 1994.13
Thus, we limited our analysis in this section to the period January 1986-December 1994. We chose the largest nine
10 Although one can argue that increasingly it is permitted de facto, particularly with the allowance of Section
20 subsidiaries. However, even Section 20 subsidiaries are limited in both their lines of business and volumes of
activity.
11 Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) used a similar approach to examine the impact of diversification on
bankruptcy risk. Boyd, et al execute the simulation of universal banks differently from our method here. They
employ dichotomous pairings (one bank holding company and one non-bank firm), whereas we create portfolios of
three segments of financial intermediaries. Boyd et al devise a scaling procedure to adjust the relative weights of
12 This methodology produces a lower bound estimate of the returns to universal banking, since potential
synergies are not considered.
13 This creates a problem of survival bias, but since we are comparing the results across surviving firms, the
effect should cancel out. The list of firms used to create universal banking portfolios appears in Appendix 1.
12depository institutions and insurance companies (on the basis of asset size) and replicated all possible combinations
of synthetic universal banks, for a total of 729 possibilities, each with 108 monthly rates of return. The mean
monthly return for synthetic universal banks is 1.1212%. In contrast, the mean monthly return in this sample over
the January 1986-December 1994 period was 1.3604% for depository institutions, 0.9177% for insurance
companies, and 1.04802% for securities firms.
[Insert Table 5 Around Here]
We use the two factor market model to compare the synthetic universal bank sample to each of the market
segments to determine whether the return differentials were a function of risk differentials. Although securities
firms had lower average returns than did universal banks (1.05% vs. 1.12%), they had the highest risk exposures,
portfolios both increases the expected return and reduces the risk exposure of securities firms. To determine
whether banks and insurance companies receive adequate returns to risk, as compared to the universal banking
portfolio, we decompose these returns further.
Table 5 estimates of the intercept term show that, over the entire time period, the synthetic universal
banking portfolio has significantly (at the 1% level) positive excess returns, consistent with a value enhancing
portfolio diversification effect. Universal banks have significantly (at the 1% level) positive excess returns in the
1988-1994 subperiod, but have significantly (at the 1% level) negative excess returns during the 1986-1988
subperiod. This result may reflect the popularity of corporate spinoffs and leveraged buyouts in the 1980’s and the
collapse of junk bonds in 1989.
Differences in systematic risk exposure are very apparent from the market betas in Table 5. In all periods,
securities firms have significantly higher market betas than universal banks and any other type of financial
intermediary. Despite tighter regulations and the restriction of governmental forbearance, both depository
institutions and insurance companies increased their market risk exposure over the nine year period. In all periods,
the systematic risk of the synthetic universal bank is significantly lower than that of securities firms. Over the
whole period 1986-1994, synthetic universal banks, and all other financial intermediaries, had significantly (at the
1% level) negative interest rate betas. Our sub-period results, however, show that the interest rate beta was
significantly positive during the period 1986- 1988; but significantly negative during the period 1988-1994. This
13is consistent with shifts in interest rate expectations, such that the 1986-1988 interest rate risk exposure reflects
expectations of interest rate increases, whereas the opposite is true for the latter sub-periods.
Evidence presented in Table 5 is consistent with a simple averaging of financial intermediaries’ returns that
reduces the risk of the synthetic universal banking portfolio. To determine whether the synthetic universal bank
has a higher expected return than the individual market segments after controlling for risk, we evaluated each return
generating function at the mean using the risk levels of each of the market segments. We found that if the universal
banking portfolio had the same market beta as the securities firms, the expected return would be 0.207% higher than
the expected return estimated from the securities firms’ return generating function. Performing the same analysis
for insurance companies, we found a yield differential of 0.11% higher for equally risky universal bank portfolios.
However, there was no evidence of gains in expected returns for commercial banks.
We performed the same analysis comparing universal banking returns to market segment returns using the
universal bank’s return generating function and interest rate risk levels for each of the market segments. An equally
risky universal bank portfolio would earn an additional 2.017% higher than insurance companies and O. 553% for
banks. Securities firms, on the other hand, did not benefit from the interest rate risk diversification benefits of
universal banking.
To further examine the risk exposure of synthetic universal banks, we utilize the two-stage (of Section III)
and three-stage procedures to examine the risk level and the unit price of risk for universal bank portfolios for the
entire 1986-1994 period. To determine the impact of the different market segments on universal bank risk and
return, we examine the market capitalization of each of the components of the universal bank portfolio. Thus, Vsec
is defined to be the book value of assets of the securities firm as a fraction of the synthetic bank’s total asset value,
as of December 1994. Similarly, Vins is the insurance company’s fraction of the synthetic universal bank’s asset
value, obtained from CRSP.
The first stage of the analysis is the reestimation of equation (1) using the synthetic universal bank sample
with a 36-month rolling window. The estimated time-varying betas are then used as dependent variables in the




is the securities firm’s proportion of the synthetic universal bank’s asset
[Insert Table 6 Around Here]
Table 6 shows that during the period 1986-1994, the synthetic universal bank portfolio had significantly
As the insurance company’s and securities firm’s proportion in the
universal bank portfolio increased, the portfolio’s excess returns increased, suggesting that there are return
enhancing benefits of diversification.
proportion invested in securities and insurance firms increases. Thus, combining securities trading and insurance
underwriting with commercial banking activity increases the market risk exposure of the universal bank portfolio.
large securities firms, as shown in Table 3 for the 1988-1994 subperiod. However, Table 3 shows that the market
risk of the insurance segment alone is lower, thereby suggesting that the insurance companies’ market risk enhancing
effect is not simply the result of averaging.
The greater the proportion of the securities trading and insurance underwriting activities, the higher the
enables synthetic universal banks to take on more of both types of risk.
We can also examine the market and interest rate risk premiums for synthetic universal banks using a three-
stage procedure similar to that of Section III. In stage one, we estimate equation (1) using synthetic universal bank
sample with 36-month rolling window. The estimated time-varying betas from stage one are used as independent
variables in a time-series analysis in stage two, using the following expression:
(11)
15The estimated cross-sectional market risk premium and interest rate risk premium from stage two are used
as dependent variables in stage three where the following equations are estimated:
(12)
(13)
[Insert Table 7 Around Here]
The results for equation (12) shown in Table 7 suggest that increasing the insurance component of the
synthetic universal bank decreases the unit price of market risk, although securities component increases the
universal bank’s market risk premium. This is interesting since securities firms have the lowest market risk
premium of all market segments during 1979-1988 and 1988-1994 periods. For the interest rate risk premium,
results from equation (13) in Table 7 show that both securities trading and insurance activities increase the universal
bank’s interest rate risk premium. Creation of synthetic universal bank portfolios appears to affect the market’s
pricing of risk.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This study examines both the quantity and price of risk exposure for different segments of financial
intermediaries. If market segmentation exists in the financial services industry, each firm’s risk exposure will be
impacted by the type of charter it holds. We distinguish between depository institutions (commercial banks, savings
banks, and S&Ls), securities firms, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial firms using each
company’s two digit SIC code. We find evidence of market segmentation in both market risk levels and risk
premiums. Securities firms, as a group, have the most market risk exposure, followed in order of descending
market beta, by banks, other financial firms, insurance companies, and mutual funds. Market risk premiums tend
to decrease as the proportion of securities firms and insurance companies in the industry increases, demonstrating
an inverse relationship between the quantity and price of market risk.
Using a two factor model, with time-varying betas and risk premiums, we find little evidence of interest
rate risk exposure across all types of financial intermediaries, suggesting the prevalence of hedging programs using
16interest rate derivatives. However, the market prices interest rate risk exposure differentially by type of financial
intermediary and across time period. We find that as a market segment, insurance companies are exposed to more
interest rate risk than any other market segment, particularly in the period late 1980’s to early 1990’s. The interest
rate risk premium for banks has been among the highest of all financial intermediaries.
When we investigate the impact of two regulatory policy changes, we find that (1) the shift in the conduct
of monetary policy towards targeting of monetary aggregates induced banks to take on more market risk due to a
decline in their charter value; (2) bank market risk-taking increased further with the introduction of risk-based
capital requirements which further reduced charter value for banks; and (3) insurance companies are subject to the
highest interest rate risk premiums during the 1988-1994 subperiod, following by commercial banks, probably due
to implicit interest rate risk subsidies under the risk-based capital requirements. Overall, during the period 1974-
1994, banks increased their market risk exposure despite the tightening of regulatory restrictions,
companies increased their interest rate risk exposure over the subperiods.
We create synthetic universal banks using portfolios comprised of banks, securities firms,
and insurance
and insurance
companies. There is evidence of significant positive excess returns for the synthetic universal banking portfolio.
The diversification benefits of universal banking are most apparent for securities firms because the average synthetic
universal bank portfolio has both a higher expected return and lower risk than the average securities firm.
Increasing the proportion of securities firms and insurance companies permits the synthetic universal bank to take
on additional market and interest rate risk exposures. Diversification benefits in the pricing of market risk are most
apparent for insurance firms. The interest rate risk premium faced by a universal bank increases with both
securities trading and insurance activities. Despite secular erosions in Glass-Steagall barriers, market segments of
financial intermediaries have significant impacts on financial firms’ risk/return tradeoff.
17References
Allen, L., J. Jagtiani, and Y. Landskroner, 1996, “Interest Rate Risk Subsidization in International Capital
Standards, ” Journal of Economics and Business, volume 48, 251-267.
Amsler and Schmidt, 1985, “A Monte Carlo Investigation of the Accuracy of Multivariate CAPM Tests, ” Journal
of Financial Economics, volume 14(3), 359-376.
Bae, S., 1990, “Interest Rate Changes and Common Stock Returns of Financial Institutions: Revisited, ” Journal
of Financial Research, Spring, 71-79.
Baums, T., 1995, “Universal Banks and Investment Companies in Germany, ” Working paper: presented at the
Conference on Universal Banking, NYU Salomon Center.
Booth, J., and D. Officer, 1985, “Expectations, Interest Rates, and Commercial Bank Stocks, ” Journal of
Financial Research, Spring, 51-58.
Boyd, J.H., S.L. Graham, and R. S. Hewitt, 1993, “Bank Holding Company Maegers With Nonbank Financial
Firms: Effects on the Risk of Failure, ” Journal of Banking and Finance 17, 43-63.
Braun, Nelson, and Sunier, 1991, “Good News, Bad News, Volatility and Betas, ” University of Chicago working
paper.
Eisenbeis, R.. 1995. “Banks and Insurance Activities, ” Working paper, presented at the Conference on Universal
banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Fama, E., and J. MacBeth, 1973, “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, ” Journal of Political
Economy, May/June, 607-36.
Ferson, W. and C. Harvey, 1991, “The Variation of Economic Risk Premiums”, Journal of Political Economy,
99, 385-415.
Ferson, W. and C. Harvey, 1993, “The Risk and Predictability of International Equity Returns”, Review of
Financial Studies, 3, 527-66.
Flannery, M. and C. James, 1984a, “The Effect of Interest Rate Changes on the Common Stock Returns of
Financial Institutions, ” Journal of Finance, September, 1141-53.
18Flannery, M. and C. James, 1984b, “Market Evidence on the Effective Maturity of Bank Assets and Liabilities, ”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, November, 435-45.
Gande, A., M. Puri, A. Saunders, and I. Walter, “Bank Underwriting of Debt Securities: Modem Evidence, ”
Working paper, presented at the Conference on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Hoshi, T., 1995, “Back to the Future: Universal Banking in Japan, ” Working paper, presented at the Conference
on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Jagtiani, J., A. Saunders, and G. Udell, 1995, “The Effect of Bank Capital Requirements on Bank Off-Balance
Sheet Financial Innovations, ” Journal of Banking and Finance, volume 19, 647-658.
Kane, E., 1995, “The Increasing Futility of Restricting Bank Participation in Insurance Activities, ” Working paper,
presented at the Conference on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Keeley, M. 1990, “Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, ” American Economic Review 80 (5),
1183-1200.
Kilgus, E., 1995, “Universal Banking Abroad: The Case of Switzerland, ” Working paper, presented at the
Conference on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Llewellyn, D., 1995, “Universal Banking and the Public Interest: A British Perspective. ” Working paper, presented
at the Conference on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Madura, J. and E. Zarruk, 1995, “Bank Exposure to Interest Rate Risk: A Global Perspective, ” Journal of
Financial Research, Spring, 1-13.
Park, Y. C., D. W. Kim, and K. S. Park, 1995, “Transition to Universal Banking: The Korean Experience, ”
Working paper, presented at the Conference on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Puri, M., 1996, “Commercial Banks in Investment Banking: Conflict of Interest or Certification Role?”, Journal
of financial Economics 40, Number 3, 373-401.
Rajan, R., 1995, “The Entry of Commercial Banks into the Securities Business: A Selective Survey of Theories and
Evidence, ” Working paper, presented at the Conference on Universal banking at NYU Salomon Center.
Shanken, J., 1992, “On the Estimation of Beta-Pricing Models, ” Review of Financial Studies}, 5(l), 1-34.
Sweeney, R. and A. Warga, 1986, “The Pricing of Interest Rate Risk: Evidence from the Stock Market, ”
Journal of Finance, 393-410.
19Unal, H. and E. Kane, 1988, “Two Approaches to Assessing the Interest Rate Sensitivity of Deposit Institution
Equity Returns, ” Research in Finance, 7, 113-37.
Yourougou, P., 1990, “Interest Rate Risk and the Pricing of Depository Financial Intermediary Common Stock, ”
Journal of Banking and Finance, 14, 803-20.
20TABLE 1
Quantity of Risk Analysis (1974-1994)
Using Two-Factor Market Model With 60-Month Rolling Betas
Results from Stage-One regressions are not reported here. Rit are monthly returns on a sample of 1,023 financial
firms. RMt are value weighted CRSP index of monthly returns. RIt are monthly returns on 3-month U.S. Treasury
bills. Dummy variables DUMsec, DUMins, DUMmf, and DUMoth are equal to 1 for securities firms, insurance
companies, mutual funds, and other financial firms respectively. Depository institutions are the base case where
all dummy variables are set to zero. Results from Stage-Two regressions are reported with P-values in parentheses.





















-.28807** .04085 .02213 .0003
(.0001) (.2940) (.6087)
-.21982** -.58535** -.18225** .0053
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
1.20735** -.05780 -.02343 .0003
(.0001) (.7104) (.8922)TABLE 2
Price of Risk Analysis (1974-1994)
Using Two-Factor Market Model With 60-Month Rolling Betas
Results from Stage-One and Stage-Two regressions are not reported here. Rit are monthly returns on a sample of
1,023 financial firms. RMt are value weighted CRSP index of monthly returns. RIt are monthly returns on 3-month
insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial firms in the sample at time t. Results from Stage-Three
regressions are reported with P-values in parentheses,











.00089 -.27633** -.09237** .02629** .05394** .0166
(.7235) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
.20785 *** -. 16947** -.52797** -.11154** -.52671** .0156
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)TABLE 3
Quantity of Risk Sub-Period Analysis (1974-79, 1979-88, 1988-94)
Using Two-Factor Market Model With 36-Month Rolling Betas
Like in the analysis of the whole sample reported in Table 1, this sub-period estimation is based on equations (l),
(2), (3), and (4). Results from Stage-One regressions are not reported here. Results from Stage-Two regressions
are reported below with P-values in parentheses. ** and * denotes significance at the 1 and 5 percent level
respectively.
Sub-Period January 1974- September 1979
Adj R
2
.04897** .00595 -.03077 .0590** .0026
(.0001) (.0780) (.8318) (.1406) (.0010)
1.12848** .96223** .1901 O** -.38624** .15153** .0578
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
-.07614** .16472 -.01588 .04649 -.15314** .0033
(.0023) (.0735) (.7893) (.2940) (.0001)
Sub-Period October 1979- June 1988
Adj R
2
-.02897 .19455** .07322 .06743* .06564* .0007
(.0954) (.0004) (.1143) (.0386) (.0207)
1.10742** -.00039 -.31778** -.61213** -.15641* .0033
(,0001) (.9976) (.0033) (.0001) (.0181)
.06053 -.39451** -.1341 -.12761* -.12325* .0007
(.0737) (.0002) (.1377) (.0446) (.0258)
Sub-Period July 1988- December 1994
b b b Adj R
2
.07574 -.00637 -.74994** -.05133 -.03139 .0007
(.3912) (.9750) (.0001) (.6257) (.8079)
1.21856** .20529 -.41759** -.71731** -.50341** .0047
(.0001) (.1264) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
-.24398 .06223 3.04783** .17323 .14879 .0007
(.5024) (.9407) (.0001) (.6893) (.7795)TABLE 4
Price of Risk Sub-Period Analysis (1974-79, 1979-88, 1988-94)
Using Two-Factor Market Model With 36-Month Rolling Betas
Like in the analysis of the whole sample reported in Table 2, this sub-period estimation is based on equations (1),
(5), (6), and (7). Results from Stage-One and Stage-Two regressions are not reported here. Results from Stage-
10 percent level respectively.
Sub-Period January 1974- September 1979
Adj R
2
17770** -3.26893** -1.751OO** 2.81536** -1.43557** .1259
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
.49889** -.90467* -5 .02709** -7.58476** 4.34783** .2332
(.0001) (.0497) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sub-Period October 1979- June 1988
b b Adj R
2
-.30688** -1 .00353** .34517** .25631** 1.08536** .1517
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
.37859** .58396** -1 .62397** -.21938** -.95655** .1654
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Sub-Period July 1988-December 1994
b b b b Adj R
2
.45522** -3.58888** -1.26768** -.09990** -.69386** .0907
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
1.63297** -19.80999** 2.06668** -.75245** -2.75118** .1477
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)TABLE 5
Sub-Period Analysis for Different Market Segments vs Universal Banks
Using Two-Factor Market Model With Constant Betas
financial firms. RMt are value weighted CRSP index of monthly returns. RIt are monthly returns on 3-month U.S.
Treasury bills. For the purpose of comparison with synthetic universal banks, the sample includes only those banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies that existed during the period January 1986 to December 1994. **, *, and
Whole Sampling Period: January 1986- December 1994
Insurance Companies
Synthetic Universal Banks
Sub-Period: January 1986- June 1988
Adj R
2
.01235** 1.11204** -.02673** .2215
.02709** 1.48727** -.06844** .3549
.00056 .92738** -.00256 .2667
.01659** 1.25256** -.03954** .5613
Market Segment Adj R
2
Depository Institutions -.08399** 1.00916** . 16749** .3711
Securities Firms -.10222 1.31148** .17237 .4812
Insurance Companies -.20174** .85475** .39863** .4417
Synthetic Universal Banks -.17388** 1.08607** .33675** .7212
Sub-Period: July 1988- December 1994
Market Segment Adj R
2
Depository Institutions .01376** 1.24959** -.03090** .1679
Securities Firms .03015** 1 .73075** -.06885** .3092
Insurance Companies .00478 1.02674** -.00861 .2054
Synthetic Universal Banks .02012** 1.47825** -.04545** .5187TABLE 6
Quantity of Risk Analysis for Synthetic Universal Banks
Using Two-Factor Market Model With 36-Month Rolling Betas
Results from Stage-One regressions are not reported here. Rit are monthly returns synthetic universal banks. RMt
are value weighted CRSP index of monthly returns. RIt are monthly returns on 3-month U.S. Treasury bills.
are respectively the proportion (based on total assets as of December 1994) of securities
firms and insurance companies in the synthetic universal bank portfolio. Results from Stage-Two regressions are








Whole Sampling Period: January 1986- December 1994
Adj R2
.01375** .00534** .01480** .0012
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
1.26814** .25147** .29348** .0310
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
-.02248** -.01242** -.03189** .0015
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)TABLE 7
Price of Risk Analysis for Synthetic Universal Banks
Using Two-Factor Market Model With 36-Month Rolling Betas
Results from Stage-One and Stage-Two regressions are not reported here. Rit are monthly returns synthetic
universal banks. RMt are value weighted CRSP index of monthly returns. RIt are monthly returns on 3-month U.S.
Treasury bills. Variables Vsec and Vins are respectively the proportion (based on total assets as of December 1994)
of securities firms and insurance companies in the synthetic universal bank portfolio. Results from Stage-Three


















(.2651) (.0001) (.0001) IIAPPENDIX I




2. Bank America Corp.
3. Morgan JP & Co. Inc.
4. Bank New York Inc.
5. Chase Manhattan Corp.
6. Bankers Trust NY Corp.
7. Bank One Corp.
8. Fleet Financial Group Inc.
9. Wells Fargo & Co.
Securities Firms:
Company Name
1. Advest Group Inc.
2. Inter Regional Financial Group
3. Morgan Keegan Inc.
4. Edwards AG Inc.
5. Bear Stems Co. Inc.
6. Interstate Johnson Lane Inc.
7. McDonald & Co Investment Inc.
8. Merill Lynch

















































































1. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.
2. Lincoln National Corp. Inc.
3. American General Corp.
4. CNA Financial Corp.















CUSIP I SIC Code
008140
534187
026351
126117
370563
744061
001055
037389
903290
6311
6311
6311
6321
6331
6311
6321
6311
6311
Symbol
AET
LNC
AGC
CNA
GRN
PVN
AFL
AOC
FG